ADB

Security Guidelines

Appendix 100

Security Planning for Meetings of the Board of Governors of the Asian Development Bank

Introduction

1. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) holds its annual Meeting of the Board of Governors (hereinafter referred to as the Annual Meeting or AM) in May of each year. The AM is a large, high visibility, widely publicized event, involving several thousands of attendees and the full participation of the media and must be organized in close cooperation with the Host Government. The size, scale and complexity of the security arrangements required to appropriately support the specific programme activities necessitates the introduction of planning guidelines to ensure a comprehensive and cohesive approach to the management of security at the AM.

Aim

2. These security planning guidelines aim to explain the mechanisms and provide an official recommendation on how the preparation and organization of security for the AM should be done and what actions should be taken before, during and after the event. Attached as appendices to these guidelines are an Annual Meeting Security Plan template and the document "AM Security Scenarios" which identifies typical threat scenarios and potential responses.

3. These guidelines aim to delineate the security planning processes in order to improve the efficiency with which ADB and the Host Government can support the security requirements and successful delivery of the Annual Meeting. The resulting operational plans and procedures must effectively manage the risks to delegates, ADB personnel, official guests and other visitors in attendance and maintain the integrity of the proceedings from security disruptions of any kind.

Parties Involved in the Planning Process

4. The principal parties involved in the security planning for the Annual Meeting are as follows:
   a) ADB AM Secretariat
   b) ADB Security Focal Point (SFP)
   c) Designated Host Government Security Focal Point
   d) Host Government Security Services
   e) Other ADB and Host Government personnel as required
   f) United Nations Security Advisor

Process Overview

   a) Identification of dates of the AM, including preparatory events and post meeting activities
   b) Number of expected participants
   c) Number of ADB personnel
   d) Attendance and number of VIPs
   e) Attendance number of delegates
   f) Location(s) of events, and description of facilities (with security related information)
   g) Location(s) and description of concurrent events, such as the Spouse Program
   h) Involvement of Host Government and agreements made for security arrangements
   i) Names and contact information of parties from the Host Government that are involved in the security of the AM
   j) Name and contact details of ADB personnel involved in the security of the AM

Security Assessment

5. At least six months prior to the Annual Meeting, the Host Government shall conduct a thorough Security Risk Assessment (SRA) of the meeting as well as specific SRA's for all proposed venues. ADB will also request the resident United Nations Security Advisor to complete similar Security Risk Assessments which can be compared with the Host Government's to provide a fuller risk profile of the AM. These SRA's should be considered living documents and updated regularly through the lead up and conduct of the AM.

6. These assessments determine:
   a) The threat and risk exposure to the AM and proposed venue(s)
   b) How the threats and risks associated with the AM and its participants can best be mitigated with local security measures
   c) If the threats and risks associated with the AM and its participants cannot be adequately mitigated with local security measures and if other options must be considered

7. These assessments enable:
   a) ADB and the Host Government to consider the level of risks and the required mitigation measures
   b) ADB and the Host Government to agree upon appropriate mitigation measures
   c) ADB and the Host Government to determine whether the available security resources are adequate to support the AM
   d) ADB and the Host Government to make necessary arrangements and plan available resources to comply with the required mitigation measures.

Technical Mission Conducted

8. ADB shall conduct a 'technical mission' in the third quarter of the year preceding the AM to begin the meeting preparations, including security arrangements. ADB will share with the Host Government:
   a) Objectives of the mission
   b) Participants of the mission
   c) Meetings to be held with the Host Country and their purposes
   d) Agreed outcomes of the mission

Assessment Mission Conducted

9. ADB shall conduct an 'assessment mission' in the first quarter of the year of the AM to assess progress of preparations to date, including security arrangements. At this time, the ADB Security Focal Point will review with the Host Government SFP the overall SRA, venue specific SRA's and the preliminary AM security plan. Decisions on further actions and preparations will be agreed and documented.

Annual Meeting Security Plan

10. The AM Security Plan builds upon the Annual Meeting SRA's and clearly outlines the responsibilities, functions and tasks of all groups and individuals providing security support for the AM. A template for the plan is provided at Appendix A.

11. The plan must include:
    a) Situation and mission: The threats and risks identified in the AM general and venue specific SRA's and a statement of responsibility of the Asian Development Bank and the Host Government
    b) Overall security operations concept and strategy
    c) Establishment, coordination, crisis response and function of the AM Security Control Centre
    d) Support to the processes of accreditation, registration and issuance of ID badges
    e) Access control, screening and surveillance
    f) Hotel/accommodation security arrangements (as applicable)
    g) Fire safety, medical response and support operations
    h) Staff deployments and post instructions including daily briefing and security bulletin, equipment, material, uniforms and plainclothes
    i) Protective services for VIP participants;
    j) Communication and logistics;

Daily Security Management

12. In accordance with the AM Security Plan, daily operational security management during the AM shall be coordinated between the ADB and Host Government SFP

13. Daily meetings including the SFPs, AM Secretariat and other relevant persons shall be held to review previous day activities and confirm current day activities

14. Timely, specific incident reports shall be logged as required

15. After-action/lessons learned exercises shall be undertaken with the aim to further improve these guidelines.

Host Government Responsibilities, Functions and Tasks

16. In accordance with the primacy of Host Government responsibility for safety and security, the Host Government is responsible for the safety and security of delegates, staff and visitors participating in the Annual Meeting. In this regard, the Host Government shall provide the level of security service protection required to ensure the effective functioning of the AM in an atmosphere of security and tranquility, free from any security disruption.

17. The provision of these requirements is based in the concept of establishing a safe perimeter, through any sort of physical barriers, whose entrances will be controlled through the vetting and accreditation of participants, as well as the screening of any person, vehicle and parcels entering the perimeter. Once the safe area is established, external perimeter protection is provided by the Host Government.

18. The Host Government must provide a senior officer as its Security Focal Point who directly supervises and directs all Host Government security elements supporting the Annual Meeting. This senior officer must work in close cooperation with the ADB SFP as the Asian Development Bank's designated security official for the AM.

Host Government Security Focal Point

19. Being appointed by his/her Government authority, the Host Government Security Focal Point works in close co-operation with the ADB SFP and is responsible for:
    a) The Host Government security services personnel, any private security company personnel and/or locally hired personnel appointed to support the security apparatus for the Annual Meeting
    b) Developing appropriate security plans for the AM and all related venues
    c) The observance of the security provisions detailed in the security plans
    d) Providing any information regarding security to the ADB SFP
    e) Providing assistance and cooperation to the ADB SFP in all security related matters.
    f) Providing support with the deployment of resources (i.e. security services presence, perimeter security, explosive detection, screening, etc.) as identified in the SRA and required in the security plan.
    g) Establishing appropriate command and control of all security related operations.

Conclusion:

20. The use of these guidelines for security planning not only streamlines the processes but also standardizes the organization and delivery of security support for the ADB Annual Meeting.

Appendices

A Template for Annual Meeting Security Plan
B Annual Meeting Security Scenarios

ADB

Appendix A - Template for Annual Meeting Security Plan

1. Situation:
1.1. Description of the Annual Meeting, synopsis
1.2. Description of the location, city, venue
1.3. Summary of the threat assessment

2. Mission:
2.1. Statement of responsibility of the Asian Development Bank
2.2. Statement of responsibility of the Host Country Government

3. Execution:
3.1. Summary of arrangements
3.2. Overall security operations concept

4. Grouping and assigned tasks:
4.1. Security organizational chart for the AM
4.2. Staffing table and contact details for each group (4.1 and 4.2 could be consolidated into one single table)

5. Command and control:
5.1. Concept
5.2. Members and contact details
5.3. Mission
5.4. Tasks

6. Coordination and crisis response - Security Control Post:
6.1. Concept
6.2. Members and contact details
6.3. Mission
6.4. Tasks

7. Role supporting accreditation and registration process:
7.1. Mission
7.2. Tasks
7.3. Procedure

8. Screening and control procedure when/if applicable:
8.1. Mission
8.2. Tasks
8.3. Procedure
8.4. Lost & found procedure
8.5. Prohibited items list and procedure

9. Daily transportation for the security servicing the conference:
9.1. Mission
9.2. Tasks
9.3. Procedure
9.4. Back up, contingency plan

10. Hotel/Accommodation security arrangements (as applicable):
10.1. Map
10.2. Pictures
10.3. Allocated rooms
10.4. Safe haven
10.5. Screening and control procedure when/if applicable
10.6. Security (company)
10.7. Back up accommodation
10.8. Hotel evacuation plan (Annex)

11. Safety, Medics and Support Operations:
11.1. Support entity and contact details
11.2. First Aid transactions procedure on site
11.3. Medical evacuation plan (from site event to designated hospital)
11.4. MEDEVAC
11.5. CASEVAC

12. Post instructions:
12.1. SOPs for each post and Security Officers
12.2. SOPs for each Police post and HG Police Officer within the defined area (in both the local language and English when/if possible)
12.3. SOPs for lost and found items

13. VIP protection:
13.1. Mission
13.2. Tasks
13.3. Procedure
13.4. Back up, contingency plan

14. Communication:
14.1 Main communication network, chart,
14.2 VHF/UHF frequencies, channel, call signs and chart
14.3 Mobile phone numbers, ADB SFPS procedure and chart
14.4 Satellite Phone numbers

15. Logistics, dedicated areas and offices (identification of the Executive Offices):
15.1. List of dedicated ADB areas and offices
15.2. Access restrictions and procedure where required
15.3. Blue print or schematic of the premises
15.4. Additional equipment required and deployment location at the venue.
15.5. Host Government support entity and contact details of focal points.

16. Briefing and reports:
16.1. Daily briefings with key security players
16.2. Daily reports to HQ
16.3. Incident reports

17. Equipment, material, uniforms and plain clothes:
17.1. List of equipment
17.2. Procedure for uniforms and plain clothes

18. Protocol issues

Appendix B - Annual Meeting Security Scenarios

Scenario 1: External Demonstration - Large numbers of activists, outside of any of the main venues		
Probability	**Impact**	**Possible activities/Action**

Low	Low	Any external large scale demonstration will be permitted to continue
		  i. There is no restriction of either vehicular or pedestrian access to any Annual Meeting venue.
		  ii. The demonstration does not present any form of safety risk to either annual meeting participants or members of the general public. (Activists throwing objects of any kind will be considered a safety risk.)
		In the event that access is blocked or the activists actions present a safety risk
		  i. ADB Security Focal Point (ADB SFP) and the Host Government Security Focal Point (HG SFP) to liaise to confirm course of action
		  ii. ADB SFP to inform Annual Meeting coordination team (CT) of proposed action
		  iii. The Quick Reaction Force (QRF) will take appropriate actions as required to disperse the demonstrators. It is fully appreciated that any actions taken by the police will be applied **with the minimum force possible**
		  iv. External police cover in the vicinity of the venues will be increased as required

Scenario 2: Demonstration involving one or more activists during the Opening Session		
Probability	**Impact**	**Possible activities/Action**

Low	Medium	This scenario presumes that the demonstrator(s) do not leave their seats; the demonstration would involve a person(s) verbally disrupting the meeting, ie, shouting, heckling, throwing of pamphlets; and presents no physical risk to meeting participants
		  i. The closest Security Officer to the incident in the Main Hall, will request that the individual(s) involved in the disruption, sit down and cause no further disruption
		Disruption continues, Opening Session unable to continue.
		  ii. ADB SFP and HG SFP/QRF liaise; decision is taken to remove participant(s)
		  iii. ADB SFP advises emcee on stage and the CT (by walkie-talkie?) of the actions the police are about to take
		  iv. The emcee advises all participants that there will be a short pause in proceedings, while the incident is dealt with. Participants are advised to remain in their seats
		  v. The QRF will enter main hall, in teams of 2
		  vi. The commanding police officer will indicate to the QRF teams which participants should be removed. The QRF teams will remove the offending participant(s) with as little disruption and force as possible
		  vii. ADB SFP advises emcee on the stage and CT (by walkie-talkie) that proceedings may commence
		  viii. Badges are taken away from participant, and participant is escorted from the building
		  ix. Registration is informed of person's identity and further access is barred
		(Cutting equipment to be available to remove handcuffs/chains if required)

Scenario 3: Demonstration involving throwing of objects/substances		
Probability	**Impact**	**Possible activities/Action**

Low	High	i. The nearest security officer reacts immediately to the incident and restrains the participant
		  ii. ADB SFP and HG SFP/QRF liaise
		  iii. ADB SFP advises emcee on stage and the CT by walkie-talkie of the actions the security forces are about to take
		Action
		  iv. to xi. will be followed as per Scenario 2

Scenario 4: Bomb Detonation at an AM Venue		
Probability	**Impact**	**Possible activities/Action**

Low	High	i. HG SFP instigates Bomb Evacuation Procedures
		  ii. ADB SFP informs CT of evacuation
		  iii. Instructions are given over PA system to evacuate building. (System may be damaged)
		  iv. Venue security staff physically clear venue and evacuate all personnel to the external assembly point
		  v. Further actions will depend on the extent of venue damage, casualties' etc.

Scenario 5: Demonstrations during President's/VIP's Press Conference		
Probability	Impact	Possible activities/Action

Low	Low	This scenario presumes that the demonstrators do not leave the seated areas, and that the demonstration would involve person/persons verbally disrupting the meeting, ie, shouting, heckling, throwing of pamphlets, and presents no physical risk to either the President/VIP, meeting participants or the demonstrator(s) themselves
		    i. If the demonstrator(s) use/grab the microphone, the microphone is turned off
		    ii. DER (on live microphone) requests that demonstrators finish their actions and sit down
		    iii. Repeat ii. (the demonstrator(s) should be allowed to continue for 3 minutes(?), judgment call!, DER to decide)
		Demonstrator(s) sit down:
		    iv. President thanks the demonstrator(s) and responds to their points
		    v. Security takes no further action
		Demonstrator(s) persist, Press Conference cannot continue:
		    vi. DER confirms to ADB SFP/HG SFP that demonstrator(s) should be removed
		    vii. No more than two QRF in room at one time
		
		Note: The President must be carefully briefed, on the actions that will be taken by the police, in the event of an incident, and also on his own personal response to any incident.

Scenario 6: Demonstration in President's/VIP's Press Conferences involving throwing of objects/substances		
Probability	Impact	Possible activities/Action

Low	Low/Medium	i. The nearest security officer reacts immediately to the incident and restrains the participant
		    ii. ADB SFP and HG SFP liaise
		Decision is taken to remove demonstrator(s)
		    iii. Two QRF enter the room and remove the demonstrator(s), one at a time, no more than two QRF in room at one time

Scenario 7: Bomb Threat during Opening Session		
Probability	Impact	Possible activities/Action
Low	Medium/High	This is probably the most difficult incident to manage in that a judgment must be made on whether the threat is genuine or a hoax. This decision will be based on the following: integrity of security cordon and access control systems, exact details of the threat, results of any police perimeter and car park checks, time of supposed detonation/location, further substantiated information from intelligence sources **This decision will be made by the ADB Security Manager** If the evacuation is decided: Action i. to iv. will be followed as per Scenario 4

Scenario 8: Fire Alarm Sounds during Opening Session (not activated by Security Personnel)		
Probability	Impact	Possible activities/Action

Low	Low/Medium	This scenario presumes that the alarm has been activated by the smashing of a "break glass" alarm by persons unknown
		    i. Venue security establishes the source of alarm
		    ii. ADB SFP advises emcee on stage and the CT by walkie-talkie of the actions the security services are taking
		    iii. The emcee advises all participants that there will be a short pause in proceedings while the cause of the alarm is confirmed, participants are advised to remain in their seats
		Fire Alarm is confirmed as genuine, evacuation required:
		    iv. ADB SFP is in constant liaison with HG SFP. When confirmed, ADB SFP advises emcee on stage and CT of validity of alarm, emcee announces evacuation of main hall
		    v. Instructions are given over PA system to evacuate building
		    vi. Police and venue security staff physically clear venue and evacuate all personnel to the external assembly point
		    vii. All personnel are evacuated to external assembly point
		    viii. Further actions will depend on the extent of venue damage, casualties, etc.
		Fire Alarm is a hoax/false alarm and represents no risk to participants:
		    ix. ADB SFP advises emcee on stage of validity of alarm, emcee announces false alarm, and reassures participants of their safety
		    x. Session continues